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Abstract The behaviour of autonomous agents may deviate from that deemed
to be for the good of the societal systems of which they are a part. Norms have
therefore been proposed as a means to regulate agent behaviours in open and
dynamic systems, where these norms specify the obliged, permitted and prohib-
ited behaviours of agents. Regulation can effectively be achieved through use of
enforcement mechanisms that result in a net loss of utility for an agent in cases
where the agent’s behaviour fails to comply with the norms. Recognition of com-
pliance is thus crucial for achieving regulation. In this paper, we propose a general
framework for observation of agents’ behaviour, and recognition of this behaviour
as constituting, or counting as, compliance or violation. The framework deploys
monitors that receive inputs from trusted observers, and processes these inputs
together with transition network representations of individual norms. In this way,
monitors determine the fulfillment or violation status of norms. The paper also
describes a proof of concept implementation of the framework, and its deployment
in electronic contracting environments.1
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1 Introduction
Business interactions are typically mediated through the use of contracts, by which
parties agree to provide goods or services to one another in support of overall busi-
ness objectives. Here, contracts offer the guarantees that are needed to provide a
degree of assurance to the contract parties, so that transactions can take place in
a secure and committed context. In seeking to automate this by means of elec-
tronic business systems, one therefore requires some analogous focus on providing
guarantees for service delivery. While there has been some previous work on such
contract-based systems, in particular driven by work on norms and normative rea-
soning, this paper is primarily concerned with the development and deployment
of practical systems for business scenarios. In particular, this paper addresses the
issues that arise when seeking to provide assurance over the actions of others. This
is achieved through the use of monitoring techniques that determine when a busi-
ness agreement has been violated so that remedial action may be taken, and when
it has been fulfilled so that the agreement concludes successfully. In doing so, the
paper adopts a normative stance, seeing agreements or contracts as specified by
norms that regulate system behaviour.
Against this background, multi-agent systems provide an ideal context in which
to consider the problems raised by monitoring electronic business contracts, since
they reflect the nature of self-interested, autonomous, problem-solving entities
working together to achieve some overarching objective, while satisfying their own
individual needs. Indeed, recent years have witnessed a growing interest in the use
of norms to regulate and coordinate agent behaviours, and so achieve the overall
objectives of multi-agent systems. Such norms specify the actions that an agent
may, should, or should not undertake, and states of affairs within the environment
that an agent may, should, or should not, allow to occur.
For example, consider the aerospace industry in which the behaviours of air-
line operators, engine manufacturers, and service sites are required to comply with
(amongst others) norms governing the repair of engines and sourcing of parts for
these repairs. Typically, engine manufacturers are under obligation to have opera-
tional engines available for the planes of a client airline operator. In order to meet
such obligations, service sites (located at airports) are obliged to repair engines
for engine manufacturers within a given time period. Other types of normative
prescription include permissions and prohibitions. For example, a service site may
either be permitted to, or prohibited from, sourcing parts for engine repair from
certain part manufacturers (where these provenance restrictions can be inherited
from the requirements of the client airline operator).
Two approaches have been taken in considering the use of norms in agent sys-
tems. In the regimentation approach [18], adopted for example by electronic insti-
tutions [9], agent behaviour is constrained to that specified by norms. Here, agent
autonomy is drastically curtailed, and such regimented systems are less flexible
in that only appropriately specified agents can join. In contrast, the enforcement
approach [5,7,16,21,30] accommodates agents that preserve a degree of autonomy
in order that they may behave in a more flexible, responsive, and ultimately more
intelligent manner. Such autonomy implies that agents can violate norms if it is
in their interest to do so, and therefore enforcement mechanisms are required to
motivate agent compliance by threatening some loss of utility for agents in case
of violation. The enforcement approach therefore requires that agent actions are
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monitored ; that is, they must be observable and recognised as complying with or
violating norms, in order that the enforcement mechanisms may be appropriately
applied.
Normative System
(e.g electronic contact)
Participants in normative system
interacting with each other
(e.g. parties to contract)
Monitor
Observations
Fig. 1 Monitor processes transition network representations of norms in underlying normative
system, together with observations of agents participating in normative system, in order to
determine the status of norms.
In this paper, we adopt the enforcement approach, since it reflects the kind of
situation we expect in business scenarios in which the participating entities are
completely autonomous and can choose to violate norms. We enumerate a set of
requirements that we argue should be met by any general and reusable framework
for monitoring of normative multi-agent systems, and describe a framework for
monitoring that satisfies these requirements, outlining a proof of concept imple-
mentation of the framework and its use in monitoring norms encoded as clauses in
electronic contracts. Our framework describes the use of monitor agents for deploy-
ment in a range of normative systems (see Figure 1), and assumes a model [30] that
abstracts from the specific representational formalism for encoding norms, and is
thus to some extent normative system neutral. We describe how a normative sys-
tem’s individual norms can be represented as transition networks that may be used
to match against observations to determine the current status of the norms, and to
facilitate further action in case of violation. In particular, we introduce the notion
of a monitor that can report on whether a norm has been fulfilled or violated, so
that sanctions can be applied as and when appropriate. The transition networks
used also provide for rudimentary explanations of normative violations. Two key
features of the framework are that:
1. there is a requirement for explicit agreement between the normative system’s
participating agents as to what world features constitute violation or fulfil-
ment of a norm, where these constitutive features can be directly mapped to
transition network arc labels; and
2. the system’s participating agents explicitly entrust observers to accurately ob-
serve and report the observed world features to monitor agents, and the par-
ticipating agents entrust monitors to report accurately on any violations that
occur.
This paper, which is a revised and extended version of [26], therefore makes
the following two distinct research contributions. First, it enumerates requirements
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for a general monitoring framework for normative multi-agent systems. Second, it
formalises such a general monitoring framework meeting the above requirements.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes example monitoring
scenarios that are referred to throughout the paper, and enumerates a set of re-
quirements for monitoring in normative systems. Section 3 then describes some
general normative concepts that our approach to monitoring makes use of; in par-
ticular the model of norms described in [30]. Section 4 then motivates and describes
an architectural overview of our approach, with particular emphasis on the rela-
tionship between our normative framework and the underlying normative system,
and how this relationship is partly established by agreements between the agents
participating in the normative system. The remainder of Section 4 describes how
individual norms are represented as transition networks, and processed by monitor
agents, and how the status of a norm is evaluated and reported together with some
limited explanation. Section 5 describes validation of our approach. We report on
a proof of concept implementation of a monitoring agent, and its processing of
transition network representations of norms encoded in an electronic contract [23,
24] specified by the CONTRACT project2. The implementation builds on work
on electronic representations and software tools for contracts [30] and their use
in a number of case studies [17]. The implementation demonstrates monitoring of
AgentSpeak(L) agents [31] whose interactions are governed by normative clauses
specified in an aerospace contract. In Section 6 we describe future work; in partic-
ular, how our approach can be extended to provide more comprehensive explana-
tions, and to implement predictive monitoring (whereby a state can be recognised
as one in which a norm is in danger of being violated). Section 7 discusses related
work, and we conclude in Section 8.
2 Requirements for Monitoring
In this section, we enumerate those requirements that should be met by any general
and reusable framework for monitoring of normative multi-agent systems. Broadly
speaking, three distinct categories of requirements can be distinguished:
– The first category relates to requirements on participating agents to agree
explicitly as to what world features constitute (count as) [32] fulfilment or
violation of norms, and what entities can be trusted to accurately observe and
report such features, and appropriately apply enforcement mechanisms.
– The second category describes requirements on monitors: to detect the status
of any given norm (i.e., whether the norm applies to some agents at any given
time so that it is in force), or whether it has been violated, or fulfilled or is
no longer in force (expired); to inform participating agents of the norms that
apply to them and when they have violated or fulfilled norms; and to provide
proper explanations of violations of norms so that responsibility can be appro-
priately assigned.
As discussed later, fulfilment of the above two categories of requirements en-
sures that a more general requirement is met: to motivate agent participation
in normative systems requires some assurance that enforcement mechanisms,
such as punishments or sanctions, are employed only as and when appropriate.
2 ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/fp7/ict/docs/enet/090219-contract_en.pdf
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– The third category relates to the adequacy of the monitoring framework’s
representational model of norms insofar as such a model should account for
different types of norms of varying degrees of complexity. At the same time,
it should also limit commitment to the specific representation of norms in the
system being monitored so as to ensure (to the extent that it is possible) that
the framework can be applied to a range of underlying normative systems so
that it is normative system neutral.
We discuss each category of requirements in the subsections below.
2.1 Requirements on Agents Participating in Normative Systems
To motivate agent participation in normative systems requires that the partici-
pating agents are given some degree of assurance that enforcement mechanisms,
such as punishments or sanctions, are employed only as and when appropriate. To
illustrate, consider the example in Table 1, which describes a purchasing scenario
involving a purchaser, P , who is buying goods, G, from a supplier, S. Here, the
purchaser P can be broken down into two parties, the actual buyer, B, and the
financial department, F , that is responsible for payment.
Clearly, any possibility that an agent (for example, representing the financial
department, F ) may be sanctioned for not complying with a norm when in ac-
tuality the agent has complied, will discourage such an agent from participating
in the normative system. Conversely, any possibility that an agent (e.g., F ) may
not be sanctioned for violating a norm when in actuality the agent has violated
it, will discourage participation of an agent (for example, the supplier of goods,
S) who is disadvantaged as a result of the violation. The likelihood of both these
types of scenario occurring to some extent depends on how violations of norms
are recognised. In the scenario of Table 1, these amount to the following specific
situations.
1. Suppose S’s observation that monies have been deposited in S’s bank account
constitutes fulfilment of the obligation on F . This is open to abuse in that S
may not inform a monitor that the monies have been deposited, resulting in
some inappropriate sanction on F (that in turn benefits S).
2. Conversely, suppose that the obligation on F is deemed to be satisfied by
a monitor agent if a message is observed as having been sent from F to S,
informing the latter that the monies have been paid. This is clearly open to
abuse, in that if F does not actually pay, F can still send the message (where
observation of this message will indicate fulfilment) and thus avoid sanction.
Hence, to motivate participation of agents in normative systems requires that
the agents explicitly agree as to what constitutes violation and fulfilment of a
norm. We can understand this requirement in terms of Searle’s work on constitu-
tive rules and socially constructed (institutional) facts [32]; collective agreement
as to the constitutive X counts as Y is needed, where the X term is the brute
fact (observation) that counts as the institutional fact that is the Y term (the
normative violation or fulfilment). Agents can thus agree as to what constitutes
violation or fulfilment of a norm, as well as when a norm is active (in force) and
when it has expired (no longer in force). They can thus limit opportunities for
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Consider an example norm, which we label NormGoods, and which describes an obligation
on the purchaser P of goods G from a supplier S, where the purchaser P is an organisational
entity consisting of two contractual parties: the buyer B and the financial department F .
If buyer B is notified by S that goods G are in stock then, unless S is declared
bankrupt, either
– B must cancel the order within 7 days of receipt of notification, or;
– B must accept the order and F must pay S for goods G within 7 days of receipt
of notification.
Table 1 Example: Goods Obligation Example
abuse by participating agents. In particular, it is the recorded existence of such
explicit agreements that help to forestall opportunities for contesting application
of sanctions (for example, through litigation).
Suppose now that S and F agree that the presence of monies deposited in S’s
bank constitutes fulfilment of the obligation. This precludes the type of abuse in
the second situation, which we refer to as sanction avoidance. However, it does
not preclude abuse of the type described in the first situation, which we refer to
as sanction imposition. To preclude the latter additionally requires that a trusted
observer is responsible for both observing the presence of the monies in the bank
account, and relaying this observation to a monitoring agent. Furthermore, partici-
pating agents also require assurances that observations are appropriately processed
and that the status of a given norm is appropriately reported by monitor agents.
In summary, the following two requirements on agents in normative systems are
important in order to motivate agent participation in the normative system being
monitored.
R1 A monitoring framework applied to a normative system, NS, requires agreement
among agents participating in NS as to what features of the world constitute ful-
filment or violation of norms.
R2 A monitoring framework applied to a normative system, NS, requires agreement
among agents participating in NS as to who is trusted to accurately observe and
report the above features.
2.2 Requirements on the Monitoring Framework
So far, we have elaborated requirements that a monitoring framework should im-
pose on the normative system that it monitors. However, additional requirements
on the monitoring framework itself are also related to assurances that enforce-
ment mechanisms are employed only as and when appropriate. In particular, there
should be detection and reporting of a given norm violation, and proper analysis
of normative violations so as to ensure that responsibility for violation is prop-
erly assigned, and that mitigating circumstances are recognised. This means that
reporting violation of a norm must be accompanied by explanations that per-
mit diagnosis. Such diagnostic explanations may also help ensure that (remedial)
changes to normative specifications can be appropriately made, so as to ensure
that the exceptional circumstances are accounted for, and so violations are less
frequent.
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Consider the example norm DriveLeft, that describes an obligation on a given agent to drive
on the left.
If the agent is driving, then it must drive on the left.
Table 2 Example: Driving Obligation Example
R3 A monitoring framework should detect and report on when a norm is violated, and
provide mechanisms for explanation of norm violations.
In order to maximise chances of compliance, agents must be made aware of
when norms apply to them, and the sanctions that will be imposed in case of
violation (so that the threat of sanction can have the required motivational force).
Ideally, agents should also be informed of when they are in danger of violation,
so that they may take appropriate measures. Any approach to monitoring should
therefore recognise and report not only on when norms are violated (or fulfilled),
but also on the states in which norms come into force (and possibly other states
in which norms are in danger of being violated) and when norms are no longer in
force. The results of such monitoring can then be fed back to the agents.
R4 A monitoring framework should detect and report on when a norm comes into
force, when a norm is not in force, and inform agents of possible sanctions in case
of violation.
2.3 Requirements for Representation of Norms
Norms may be represented and implemented in many different ways, and in dif-
ferent contexts. For example, norms may be represented as logical formulae in de-
ontic logic contexts (e.g., [34]), as clauses in electronic contracts (e.g., [30]), or as
programming constructs in programming environments for normative multi-agent
systems (e.g., [7]). Thus, for a monitoring framework to be applicable to a wide
variety of normative systems requires that the representation of norms assumed by
the framework is (to the extent that it is possible) normative system neutral. That
is, the representation of norms for processing by monitors should not commit to
specific representational and implementation features, nor to dependencies between
norms (since one would not want to assume any workflow commitments encoded
by these dependencies in the underlying normative system). We thus specify the
following requirement.
R5 Modular representations of norms should be available for monitoring, where these
representations do not commit to specific representation of, or inter-dependencies
between, norms in the normative system being monitored.
Norms specify behaviours and world states that are obliged, permitted and pro-
hibited, and that apply to agents acting jointly. These agent behaviours and world
states may require complex representations, rather than simple atomic logical rep-
resentation. For example, consider the Goods Obligation in Table 1 that applies
to both the buyer B and the financial department F , where what is obliged is
specified as a disjunction, where the second disjunct is itself a conjunction.
Furthermore, norms not only identify states that must be realised (achieved)
at a given moment in time, as in Table 1, but also states that must (or may or
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must not) be maintained over a given time period. These are respectively referred
to as achievement norms and maintenance norms. For example, Table 2 describes
a scenario with a maintenance obligation, in which an agent must always drive on
the left3. Here, the status of the obligation can toggle between violated (whenever
the agent is driving on the right) and fulfilled (whenever the agent is driving on
the left) during the period for which the norm is in force (that is, while the agent
is driving). We thus identify the following requirements.
R6 Any general and widely applicable approach to monitoring must account for repre-
sentation of complex behaviours and states of interest, enacted and brought about
jointly by groups of agents.
R7 Any general and widely applicable approach to monitoring must account for both
achievement and maintenance obligations.
In the subsequent sections we describe a general framework for monitoring
and discuss how the framework satisfies thes above listed requirements. We begin
by reviewing previous work [30] on a general model of norms that is sufficiently
abstract as to be applicable in a variety of normative contexts. The model makes
some conceptual distinctions that are of particular relevance from a monitoring
perspective, and that we thus adopt for this paper (although the framework can
easily assume other models).
3 A General Model of Norms
In the model described in [30], some general normative concepts shared by existing
work on norms and normative systems (such as [11,19]) are identified. This model
distinguishes between different types of norms: obligations, prohibitions and per-
missions. In this paper, our primary focus is on obligations, given that our main
interest is in monitoring obligations and prohibitions, and that [30] models pro-
hibitions to do X (or bring about X) as obligations not to do X (not to bring
about X). However, we also consider permissions and will illustrate monitoring of
obligations and permissions in Section 5’s use case.
More specifically, the model identifies whether the norm is an obligation or
permission (the NormType). It also distinguishes under which conditions the
norm comes into force (NormActivation), the state of interest (NormCondition)
obliged or permitted to be brought about by the agents to which the norm is
addressed (NormTarget), and the conditions under which the norm is no longer
in force (NormExpiration). (We refer to NormActivation, NormCondition and
NormExpiration, collectively, as a norm’s components.) Thus, a norm N is mod-
elled as a tuple:
〈NormType
NormActivation,
NormCondition,
NormExpiration,
NormTarget〉
3 One can conceive of this obligation as applying to human and automated agents (robot
vehicles).
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An instance of N is said to come into force, or is activated, if the conditions,
or state of interest, described by NormActivation hold. When N is activated, then
N is not violated if the state of interest described by NormCondition is brought
about by N ’s NormTarget in the case that N ’s NormType is obligation; simi-
larly, when N is activated, then N is executed if the state of interest described
by NormCondition is brought about by N ’s NormTarget in the case that N ’s
NormType is permission. The norm remains in force until such a time as the state
described by NormExpiration holds.
The states of interest referred to above describe states of the world in which
actions have been performed (for example, messages sent) or certain properties
hold (for example, the temperature is maintained above 23 degrees for at least 90%
of the time). [30] build on this model to develop an operational semantics for
normative systems, whereby one can reason about norms and their changing status
over time.
To illustrate this general model, the example norms of Table 1 and 2 are rep-
resented in the appropriate structure in Table 3 and Table 4. For the Goods Obli-
gation of Table 3, the final clause of NormCondition indicates that the obligation
is not violated as long as the current time is within seven days of receipt of noti-
fication that the goods are in stock. If the seven day period elapses, and it does
not hold that B has cancelled the order, or B has accepted the order and F has
paid S for goods G, then the obligation is said to be violated.
Notice that if S is bankrupt, as indicated in the final clause of NormExpiration,
then the norm no longer applies. While such an exception might be expected to
have been encoded in the activation condition, if so encoded, it may be that S is
declared bankrupt after the norm has been activated, and so the norm would in-
appropriately remain in force. Encoding this exception in the expiration condition
ensures that the norm ceases to be in force in such circumstances.
Table 3 Goods Obligation
NormType obligation
NormActivation buyer B is notified by S that goods G are in stock at time T
NormCondition B cancels the order, or
B accepts the order and F pays S for goods G, or
it is less than 7 days after T
NormExpiration B cancels the order, or
B accepts the order and F pays S for goods G, or
it is greater than 7 days after T , or
S is bankrupt
NormTarget B, F
Table 4 Driving Obligation
NormType obligation
NormActivation an agent X begins driving
NormCondition agent X is driving on the left
NormExpiration agent X stops driving
NormTarget X
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4 A Framework for Monitoring
Given the model of norms just introduced, we can now proceed to describe a
framework for monitoring the behaviour of agents deployed in normative systems,
highlighting how the framework addresses the requirements enumerated in Section
2. Recall that we aim at an approach that is generic and applicable to a range of
dynamic open normative systems, including normative organisations developed by
the kinds of dedicated languages described in [7], as well as electronic contracting
frameworks [30] in which contract clauses specify norms that the contract parties
must comply with.
4.1 Monitoring Framework Architecture
We begin by describing the monitoring framework architecture: the relationships
and information flows between a normative system’s constituent agents, the var-
ious entities responsible for observing, monitoring and managing norms, and the
environment. The architecture is so specified as to provide for satisfaction of re-
quirements R1 and R2 from Section 2.1.
The architecture (shown in Figure 2) includes trusted observers that report to
monitors on whether states of interest referenced by norm components do or do
not hold. A monitor (which is itself an agent, and represented by the large oval
in the centre of the figure) processes these observations together with transition
network representations of norms (described in detail in Section 4.3) to determine
whether a violation (for example) has occurred. Agents are treated as black boxes
so that their internal state transitions are invisible to the monitors; the only as-
sumptions we make about the normative system, NS, being monitored, and the
agents deployed in NS are as follows.
1. The norms in NS conform to the general model of norms in Section 3, in
the sense that it is possible to identify a norm’s type, target, and components
(NormActivation, NormCondition and NormExpiration).
2. The agents in NS are capable of making agreements as to what features of the
world count as a given norm’s components.
3. The agents in NS are capable of making agreements as to which entities are
responsible for observing and reporting the features in (2), and monitoring the
norms.
A mapper maps norms contained in NS to their network representations. These
mappings also take as input the contents of the agreements described in point (2)
above, where these contents are required for annotation of the network represen-
tations. The network representations are subsequently provided as off-line input
to the monitors (identified by the agents in NS or other parties).
At run time, monitors subscribe to all observers entrusted with reporting on the
states of interest identified by a norm’s components. These monitors can identify
which observers to subscribe to, based on the network representations. Notice
that there is nothing in the specification of the monitor that ties it to a particular
normative system.
Observers notify monitors as to whether states of interest hold, by notifying
monitors of predicates describing properties of the world. These properties may
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Generator
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norms
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Manager
What are the norms 
violated, why, and how
Observers
Fig. 2 Monitoring architecture and its relationship to a normative system.
refer to actions having been performed, where such actions include messages ex-
changed among agents and messages exchanged between agents and the environ-
ment. The observers are external to the normative system itself; their role is only
to report on whether predicates hold, and they are not responsible for any kind of
processing of this information. Thus, any environmental artefact can be assigned
trusted observer status, including internet sites, human agents, banks, description
logic reasoners, etc.
Monitors process observations together with the network representations of the
norms, to determine when a norm is activated, fulfilled or violated, or has expired.
Finally, the monitor informs manager agents of norms that have been violated,
and of the agents responsible for violation. Manager agents then, in turn, impose
sanctions on the relevant agents.
To reiterate, the choice of observers (and monitors) is application specific, and
agreed to by the agents whose behaviours are being observed, where such agree-
ments constitute declarations of trust. However, the behaviours of observers (and
monitors) can themselves be governed by normative clauses, and thus observed
and monitored for deviation from their expected behaviour. This would reduce
the potential for collusion (for example, an agent dealing with eBay is more likely
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to trust a PayPal observer, even though PayPal is owned by eBay, if the behaviour
of PayPal is itself normatively prescribed and sanctioned in case of violation).
4.2 An Overview of Norm Representation and Processing
In this section we provide an overview of how individual norms are represented and
processed by monitors. We summarise how our approach satisfies the requirements
enumerated in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. In Section 4.3 we then more formally describe
how norms conforming to Section 3’s semantic model are mapped to transition
networks. Section 4.4 presents a monitoring algorithm for processing such transition
networks.
4.2.1 Transition network representations of norms
Individual norms — obligations and permissions4 — can be represented as tran-
sition networks5 that conform to the semantic model reviewed in Section 3. Ac-
cording to the model, an obligation norm is abstract until it is instantiated, and it
is activated if the condition specified by NormActivation holds, at which point it
may be violated or not violated depending on whether the NormCondition holds.
The norm remains in one of these latter two states, potentially switching between
them, until it expires when NormExpiration holds. Given this model, and these
states, appropriate transition networks are thus labelled directed graphs of the
form:
({S1, S2, S3, S4, S5}, A−→12,A−→23, A−→24, A−→34, A−→43, A−→35,A−→45)
where, for i, j = 1 . . . 5, Si is a node, and A−→ij denotes a set of labelled arcs con-
necting Si to Sj. Figure 3 depicts a generic transition network representation of
a norm where, intuitively, S1 denotes that the norm is abstract, S2 denotes that
the norm is instantiated (i.e., activated or in force), S3 denotes that the norm is
violated, S4 denotes that the norm is not violated, and S5 denotes that the norm
has expired (is no longer in force).
A monitor’s processing of such a transition network involves matching ob-
servations relayed to the monitors by trusted observers. These observations de-
scribe the states of interest specified by the norm’s components, NormActivation,
NormCondition and Norm Expiration. The monitor matches these observations
against the labels of the transition network’s arcs indicating the corresponding
states of interest, so as to transition the network from one node to the next. In
this way, a monitor can determine when a norm becomes activated, expires, and
when it fulfilled or violated.
4 Recall that we assume prohibitions to do X (or bring about X) are modelled as obligations
not to do X (bring about X).
5 Note that these network representations share some features in common with Augmented
Transition Networks (ATN s) [35], where the latter provide for recursive labelling of arcs by
ATN s themselves (reflecting their initial development for natural language processing).
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Fig. 3 Generic transition network representation of a norm.
4.2.2 Processing transition networks
More specifically, each transition indicated above corresponds to a particular mean-
ingful transition in the status of a norm. In this subsection, we elaborate these
specific transitions in more detail, for each norm component.
In what follows we assume that each norm component is represented in dis-
junctive normal form; that is, each norm component is of the form, α1 ∨ α2 ∨ . . .,
where each αi is a conjunction, β1 ∧ β2 ∧ . . ., and each βj is a possibly negated
atomic predicate formula, or complex temporal expression.
Consider an abstract norm N . When instantiated as NI, and so activated due
to N ’s activation condition holding, a copy of the transition network representing
N is made, where the copy has transitioned across one of the arcs in A−→12 so that
the transition network for NI is in the activation state S2. When the transition
network TNN representing a norm N is copied to obtain the transition network
TNNI representing NI, we say that TNNI is an instantiation of TNN .
The arcs inA−→12 are labelled by the state of interest identified byNormActivation
where, as indicated above, NormActivation is of the form α1∨α2∨. . ., and each arc
is labelled by one of these disjuncts (where each disjunct may itself be a conjunc-
tion). Hence, if observers send messages to a monitor indicating that at least one
αi holds, then the monitor transitions the corresponding arc of TNN , resulting in
the instantiated TNNI being in S2. Thus not only can the monitor report that
the norm N is activated, but it can also report the reasons for the activation (that
αi holds).
Now, the instantiated norm NI must either be violated or not violated. In the
latter case, we use A−→24 for the relevant transitions. The arcs in A−→24 are labelled
by the state of interest identified by NormCondition, where NormCondition =
γ1 ∨ γ2 ∨ . . ., and each arc is labelled by one of these disjuncts. Hence, if upon
activation, observers send messages to the monitor indicating that at least one γi
holds, then the monitor transitions the corresponding arc in A−→24, so that TNNI
is now in the state S4 in which:
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– if NormType = permission thenNI is said to have been made use of (executed);
and
– if NormType = obligation then NI is said to be not violated.
As indicated above, not only can the monitor report the status of NI, but it can
also provide the reasons as given by the label of the arc transitioned.
Conversely, we can consider the case in which a norm is violated. Suppose
NormCondition is of the form (β1∧β2)∨(β3). Then, by De Morgan’s lawsNormCon-
dition does not hold if neither β1 or β3 hold (despite the fact that β2 may hold), or
neither β2 or β3 hold (despite the fact that β1 may hold). Thus, (as is made more
precise in Section 4.3) NormCondition defines the labels of arcs in A−→23, such that
if immediately upon activation, the state of interest identified by at least one arc
in A−→23 does not hold (in which case we say that NormCondition does not hold),
then TNNI transitions across this arc to S3, where:
– if NormType = permission then NI is said not to have been made use of (not
executed); and
– if NormType = obligation then NI is said to be violated.
Notice that a permission may toggle between not executed and executed, and
an obligation may toggle between violated and not violated. The latter may occur
when we are dealing with a maintenance obligation such as always drive on the
left ; the obligation may toggle between violated and not violated depending on
whether the driver is driving on the right or the left at any given time point.
Similarly a permission to drive on the left may or may not be executed at any
given time point. In general then, if TNNI is in S3, and NormCondition holds,
then the norm transitions from S3 to S4. If TNNI is in S4, and NormCondition
does not hold, then the network transitions to S3.
Finally, we need to consider the case of norm expiration. If some disjunct in
NormExpiration = 1 ∨ 2 ∨ . . . holds at the time of activation, then the transition
network for the abstract norm is not instantiated. If, on the other hand, we already
have the instantiated transition network, (TNNI), and observers send messages
to the monitor indicating that at least one i holds then, if TNNI is in S3 or S4,
the monitor transitions the corresponding arc, so that TNNI is now in the expired
state S5, and the monitor can report: first that the norm has expired, providing
the reasons as given by the label of the arc transitioned; and second whether the
norm expired having been fulfilled (executed) if the transition to S5 was from S4,
or violated (not executed) if the transition to S5 was from S3.
4.2.3 Example transition networks
We illustrate these transitions with some example transition network representa-
tions of norms and their processing. Consider the maintenance driving obligation
from Section 3. Informally, this norm can be represented as the transition network
in Figure 4. Now, if an observer informs the monitor that driver X has set out on a
car journey at time T1, then the instantiated network is transitioned across to S2.
Now suppose that an observer informs the monitor that driver X has set out not
driving on the left (and so driving on the right) at time T1. Hence, on the same
time tick the network transitions to the violated state S3. If, at the next time tick
(T1 + 1), driver X is observed as driving on the left, then the network transitions
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to the non violated state S4. It can be seen that the transition network can toggle
between S3 and S4 depending on whether driver X is observed as driving on the
right or left, until such a time as the expiration condition holds (and driver X is
observed as having ended his journey).
S1 S2
S4
S3
S5
agent X begins
driving
X driving 
on left 
not X  driving 
on left 
X stops
driving 
X driving 
on left 
X stops
driving 
not X  driving 
on left 
Fig. 4 Informal illustration of a maintenance obligation represented as a transition network
Table 5 Traffic Warden Obligation
NormType obligation
NormActivation car is parked on a yellow line between 2pm and 3pm
NormCondition either post a penalty notice before leaving the scene, or
call for a tow truck before leaving the scene
NormExpiration a penalty has been posted, or
a tow truck has been called, or
the warden has left the scene
NormTarget traffic warden
As a second example, consider the achievement obligation in Table 5, in which
the norm specifies what a traffic warden is obliged to do when a car parks on
a yellow line between 2pm and 3pm.6 Informally, this norm can be represented
as the transition network in Figure 5. If an observer informs the monitor that
NormActivation holds true, then the instantiated network is created, and tran-
sitioned across to S2. Now, if an observer informs the monitor that the traffic
warden does not immediately leave the scene, then the network transitions across
the arc labelled not left scene to the node S4 denoting the not violated state of the
norm. At this point, either one of the following situations arises.
– The warden posts a penalty notice. Here, NormExpiration holds and the obli-
gation has been fulfilled since it is in S4 prior to transitioning across the cor-
responding arc to the expiration state S5.
6 Note that the fact that the norm does not expire after 3pm means that the traffic warden
is still obliged to penalise as long it is the case that the car was observed on a yellow line in
the 2-3pm time period.
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– The warden does not post a penalty notice and does not call a tow truck, and
leaves the scene. The conjuncts on the arc from S4 to S3 hold, and the arc is
preferentially transitioned to S3 and then to the expiration state S5 along the arc
labelled left scene. Notice the importance of the procedural requirement that
the labels of arcs between S3 and S4 are checked and transitioned prior to the
arcs leading from S3 and S4 to S5. In this example, it would be inappropriate
to transition immediately from S4 to S5 along the arc labelled left scene, since
the warden would then incorrectly be deemed to have fulfilled his obligation.
Furthermore, notice that achievement obligations do not toggle from violated
to not violated, so that the arcs in A−→34 are not (and logically cannot be)
transitioned. However, for simplicity we assume a uniform transition network
representation of maintenance and achievement obligations and permissions.
S1 S2
S4
S3
S5
car parked 
on yellow line
V 
pp 
tt 
nl 
V 
nl tt pp
pp
tt
left scene
pp
tt
left scene
2pm - 3pm
V = not penalty posted
and not tow truck called
and left scene
nl = not left 
scene
tt = tow truck 
called
pp = penalty posted
Key
Fig. 5 Informal illustration of an achievement obligation represented as a transition network
4.2.4 Requirements on monitoring and norm representation
Given this model, it can be seen that the transition network representation of
norms for monitoring satisfies the requirements R5, R6 and R7 enumerated in
Section 2.3 given that:
1. it assumes an abstract general model of norms;
2. it provides for representation of complex behaviours and states of interest en-
acted and brought about jointly by groups of agents;
3. it models achievement and maintenance norms;
4. only behaviours specified by the norms are represented, so that a given transi-
tion network can represent the same norm specified in any one of a number of
normative systems; and
5. transition network representations of norms are independent of each other,
allowing run time addition and removal of norms.
Furthermore, the processing of norms provides for satisfaction of requirements
R3 and R4 enumerated in Section 2.2, in that the status of a norm can be re-
ported on, and the arcs transitioned provide rudimentary explanations of why a
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given norm has the status reported. Note that although not addressed in this pa-
per, Section 6 describes future work addressing generation of more comprehensive
explanations.
4.3 Mapping Norms to Transition Networks
We have described how transition networks capture the semantics of our norm
representation, and the lifecycle of norms through their activation and expiration.
In this section we formally define the mapping from an abstract norm to a tran-
sition network, grounding the more general processing of such networks discussed
above.
We begin by considering the labels of arcs in transition networks. Suppose we
have two normative systems NS1 and NS2 with norms N1 and N2 and their
transition networks TNN1 and TNN2 respectively. The fact that N1’s activation
condition A holds, is observed and reported on by observer O1 (as agreed to by
the agents in NS1). Now, suppose that N2 has the same activation condition A
that is observed by O2 (as agreed to by the agents in NS2). In such a situation,
a monitor must be able to identify which transition network it must process. It
would clearly be inappropriate if the monitor is informed by O1 that A holds,
and then monitors for fulfillment of the norm represented by TNN2. However, if
the relevant arc in TNN1 is labelled by both the activation condition A and O1,
then the monitor knows that it is TNN1 that it should process. For this reason,
and because monitors may monitor multiple normative systems, the labels of arcs
in a norm’s transition network include the observer identifiers that are uniquely
entrusted by the normative system’s agents to relay the truth of predicates that
label each arc. A consequence of this is that it additionally enables a monitor to
identify which observers to subscribe to when processing transition networks.
Now, recall that the norm components NormActivation, NormCondition, and
NormExpiration in Section 3’s general semantic model of norms, are assumed to
be representable as canonical disjunctive normal form (DNF ) clauses: α1∨ . . .∨αn
where, for i = 1 . . . n, αi is a conjunction, β1 ∧ . . . ∧ βm. Here, for j = 1 . . .m, βj
is either a complex temporal expression, or a predicate formula that is an atomic
predicate or such a predicate preceded by ¬. Each predicate formula is a description
of a state of interest or an action description, including a message sent or received
by an agent, where we assume that the action description is the single argument
of the predicate happened.
As discussed in Section 4.1, each DNF representation of a norm component is
explicitly agreed, by the agents in the normative system containing the norm, to
count as the norm component it represents. The observers entrusted by these agents
to observe and report on the states of interest specified in these representations
are then identified for each β. In general, each temporal expression or predicate
formula β is associated with a unique observer, Obβ , which sends message Mβ
to the monitor, informing it that β does or does not hold.7 In what follows, we
7 Notice that if what is being observed is an action that is not a message, then Obβ may
instead observe for a predicate description of the postcondition of the action. Whether one
includes a direct reference to the action with happened(. . .), or to a predicate description of
the state of interest brought about by the action, impacts on the flexibility which with a norm
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thus assume a function, map, which maps a predicate formula to an observer and
message (or other state or action):
map : β 7→ (Obβ , Mβ)
For the traffic warden obligation in Table 5, the conjuncts in the activation
condition β1 ∧ β2 are mapped as follows (where variables are denoted by strings
beginning with upper case letters):
β1 7→ (obparking attendent, {park(Car, yellow line)}),
β2 7→ (obcalendar1 , {(2pm ≤ Now ≤ 3pm)})
We can now formally define the mapping of a norm to a transition network. Before
doing so, recall that in Section 4.2.1 we illustrated how by negating NormCondition
we may obtain another DNF representation, where if any one of the disjuncts does
not hold, then the network is transitioned across the corresponding arc to the
violated state S3. For example, given NormCondition (β1 ∧ β2) ∨ (β3)), we first
negate NormCondition, and then by the standard application of De Morgan’s laws
obtain the equivalent conjunctive normal form (CNF) formula (¬β1∨¬β2)∧(¬β3),
which can be expressed in its equivalent DNF as (¬β1∧¬β3)∨(¬β2∧¬β3). In what
follows, therefore, when we write ¬φ, where φ is a formula in DNF, we assume
that ¬φ is the equivalent CNF formula obtained by application of De Morgan’s
laws, and for any CNF formula ψ, we write fDNF (ψ) to denote the equivalent
DNF representation of ψ. Also, in the following definition we will as an abuse of
notation use the logical conjunction connective to denote the conjoining of tuples
returned by the function map.
Definition 1 (Formal mapping of norms to transition networks)
If φ be a DNF formula (β11 ∧ . . . ∧ β1m) ∨ . . .∨ (βk1 ∧ . . . ∧ βkn), then
TN Lab(φ) = (map(β11) ∧ . . . ∧map(β1m)) ∨ . . . ∨ (map(βk1) ∧ . . . ∧map(βkn))
where (map(β11)∧. . .∧map(β1m)) , . . . , (map(βk1)∧. . .∧map(βkn)) are individually
referred to as the disjuncts in TN Lab(φ).
If N = (NormType, NormActivation, NormCondition, NormExpiration,
NormTarget), then the sets of arcs in
TNN = ({S1, S2, S3, S4, S5}, A−→12,A−→23, A−→24, A−→34, A−→43, A−→35, A−→45)
are defined as follows:
• A−→12 = {(S1, S2) with label L | L is a disjunct in TN Lab(NormActivation }.
• A−→24 = {(S2, S4) with label L | L is a disjunct in TN Lab(NormCondition) }.
• A−→34 = {(S3, S4) with label L | L is a disjunct in TN Lab(NormCondition) }.
• A−→23 = {(S2, S3) with label L | L is a disjunct in TN Lab(fDNF (¬NormCondition))}.
• A−→43 = {(S4, S3) with label L | L is a disjunct in TN Lab(fDNF (¬NormCondition))}.
• A−→35 = {(S3, S5) with label L | L is a disjunct in TN Lab(NormExpiration)}.
• A−→45 = {(S4, S5) with label L | L is a disjunct in TN Lab(NormExpiration) }.
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Let the norm components of Norm-Goods be defined as follows:
– NormActivation = happened( (notify(S,B,G, in stock, T ) )
– NormCondition =
happened( send(cancel(B,S,G,T2)) ) ∨
(happened( send(accept(B,S,G,T3)) ) ∧ payment received(S,F ,G,T4)) ∨
(Now ≤ T + 7)
– NormExpiration =
happened( send(cancel(B,S,G,T2)) ) ∨
(happened( send(accept(B,S,G,T3)) ) ∧ payment received(S,F ,G,T4)) ∨
(Now > T + 7)
Table 6 Example: Goods Obligation Example
We illustrate the above mapping with the Goods obligation in Table 6. The
transition network for the norm is shown in Figure 6 (though we omit reference to
the observers identified in the mapping). Notice that when defining the labels of
arcs transitioning to the violated state S3, we first obtain
¬happened( send(cancel(B,S,G,T2)) ) ∧
(¬happened( send(accept(B,S,G,T3)) ) ∨ payment received(S,F ,G,T4)) ∧
¬ (Now ≤ T + 7)
by application of De Morgan’s laws, and then representing in DNF we obtain
the two disjuncts labelling the two arcs from S2 to S3 and from S4 to S3.
We conclude by observing that while we have not exemplified permissions,
examples of permissions will be described in the use case validation in Section 5.
4.4 Processing of Transition Networks by Monitors
This section describes an implementation of a monitor that receives messages from
observers, and processes them so as to transition the transition network represen-
tations of the norms being monitored. At its core, our monitor contains a message
store that is updated by received messages. When an arc is satisfied (see Definition
2 below) with respect to the contents of a message store, the monitor transitions
the transition network. Recalling our discussion at the end of Section 3, for any
norm N we consider its abstract TNN and its instantiated TNNI , where TNN is
in state S1 and is said to be abstract because its arcs are labelled by expressions
whose variables will be instantiated by concrete situations in which the norm comes
into force (is activated). Hence, given TNN , when an arc a in A−→12 is satisfied, the
resulting grounding of the variables in the Mβs labelling a is propagated to the
variables in expressions labelling the remaining arcs in TNN , thus creating the in-
stantiated instance TNNI , where TNNI is then transitioned to S2 (corresponding
to activation of the norm).
When norms are fulfilled or violated, the monitor generates notifications to the
manager to take appropriate action. We illustrate this operation in Figure 7, which
shows the flow of messages from the observers to the monitor’s message queue, its
processing and subsequent notifications to the manager.
can be fulfilled. In the latter case, the norm’s targets have some flexibility in terms of the
actions executed to bring about the state of interest.
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happened(notify
(S,B,G,in_stock,T))
S1 S2
S4
S3
S5
hsc =
happened(send(cancel(...)))
hsa =
happened(send(accept(...)))
pr =
payment_received(...)
hsc
hsa ? pr
N = Now ≤ T + 7
N
hsc
Now > T + 7
¬hsc ? 
¬hsa  ??¬?
¬hsc ? 
¬pr  ??¬?
¬hsc ? 
¬hsa  ??¬?
¬hsc ? 
¬pr  ??¬? hsa ? 
pr
N
hsc
hsc
hsa ? pr
hsa ? pr
Now > T + 7
Key
Fig. 6 Transition network representation of Example 1’s Norm Goods obligation
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Fig. 7 Overview of the monitor control loop.
This process is more precisely illustrated in Algorithm 1, which describes the
control loop used in our monitor. The algorithm makes use of the test function
satisfied(MSt,lab(a)) which is defined as follows:
Definition 2 Let MSt be a message store and lab(a) denote the label of an an arc
a, where lab(a) is of the form (map(β1) ∧ . . . ∧map(βn)) = ( (Obβ1 , Mβ1) ∧ . . .∧
(Obβn , Mβn) ). Then:
satisfied(MSt,lab(a)) returns true iff for i = 1 . . . n, Mβi ∈MSt, and Mβi is received
from Obβi .
As long as the monitor is active, the algorithm loops. It operates by retrieving
a message from the message queue, and adding it to the message store (Lines
Monitoring Compliance with E-Contracts and Norms 21
2–4). The algorithm then checks whether any abstract norms can be instantiated
(Lines 7–13). This is done by checking whether an arc from S1 to S2 is satisfied
(Line 7). If so, an instantiated version of the norm is created and added to the
set of instantiated norm transition networks, in state S2 (line 10). The remainder
of the algorithm, starting at line 15, operates on instantiated norms. Lines 18–26
check whether any arc transitions from the current state can occur.8 If so, the
transition is made (Line 21), in which case Lines 29 – 42 result in the manager
being notified of the transition; Line 31 informs the manager of a violation, and
similarly, Lines 32 – 35 inform the manager whether a permission has started or
stopped executing. Lines 37 and 40 then inform the manager of expiration and
norm compliance respectively. Norm instantiation is reported in Line 11.
5 Validation: Monitoring of Contractual Clauses
In this section we report on a proof of concept implementation that has been
used to validate our approach to monitoring. The work reported is more com-
prehensively described in [24]. Specifically, we have implemented and deployed a
monitor in a prototype multi-agent system in which agents exchange messages
that correspond to obliged, prohibited and permitted behaviours encoded in an
electronic contract. Recent work on electronic representations and software tools
for contracts [30] has highlighted a number of case studies [17], including one for
aerospace logistics [22]. This involves aerospace agents — airline operators (AOs),
engine manufacturers (EM s), and service sites (SSs) — whose behaviours are re-
quired to comply with (amongst others) norms governing the repair of engines
and sourcing of parts for these repairs. In particular, it is commonplace for EM s,
located at airports, to be under obligation to have operational engines available
for the planes of a client AO. Furthermore, AOs may dictate permissions and pro-
hibitions on the sourcing of parts (provenance restrictions) for their engines. These
norms are then inherited in contracts between EM s and service sites responsible
for the actual servicing and repair of engines. For instance, in order for a given EM
Rolling Royce to fulfill its obligations and provenance restrictions for a given AO,
Rolling Royce’s contract C with a service site Heathhedge stipulates a contractual
obligation on Heathhedge to repair engines in a given time, and prohibitions and
permissions on Heathhedge on the ordering of parts. Examples of these contractual
norms, as represented in Section 3’s normative model, are shown in Tables 7, 8,
and 9.
Notice that the prohibition on sourcing of parts is modelled as an obligation
not to source parts, and both this obligation and the permission on sourcing parts
do not have expiration conditions; they remain in force indefinitely (that is, as
long as Heathhedge remains a party to the contract).
Our proof-of-concept prototype implements the monitoring architecture in Sec-
tion 4.1. Specifically, it implements:
– the normative system’s participants (i.e., the contract parties) Rolling Royce
and Heathhedge and the part manufacturers in the environment, as agents in
the multi-agent programming language AgentSpeak(L) [31];
8 Notice that starting with j = 3 ensures that transitions from S4 to S3 are checked before
transitions from S4 to S5, thus enforcing the procedural requirement discussed in Section 4.2.3.
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Algorithm 1 Monitor control loop
Require: Message queue Qmsg
Require: Message store MSt
Require: Set of abstract norm transition networks XAbs
Require: Set of instantiated norm transition networks XInst
1: while Monitor is active do
2: while Qmsg is not empty do
3: Retrieve Msg from head of Qmsg
4: Add Msg to MSt
5: for all Abstract norm transition network A in XAbs do
6: for all Arcs a in A−→12A do
7: if satisfied(MSt, lab(a) then
8: Create a norm transition network instance I from A
9: Add I to XInst
10: move I to state S2
11: Notify manager of instantiation
12: end if
13: end for
14: end for
15: for all Instantiated norm transition network I in XInst do
16: transition=false
17: s = X where I is in state SX
18: for j = 3 . . . 5 such that j 6= s do
19: for all Arcs a in A−→sjI do
20: if satisfied(MSt, lab(a)) then
21: move I to state Sj
22: transition=true
23: break
24: end if
25: end for
26: end for
27: if !transition then
28: continue
29: else
30: if I is in state S3 and I is an obligation then
31: Notify manager of violation
32: else if I is in state S3 and I is a permission then
33: Notify manager of permission execution
34: else if I is in state S4 and I is a permission then
35: Notify manager that the permission is not being executed
36: else if I is in state S5 then
37: Notify manager of expiry
38: Remove I from XInst
39: else
40: Notify manager of compliance
41: end if
42: end if
43: end for
44: end while
45: end while
– an AgentSpeak(L) observer agent that is assumed to be entrusted by the contract
party agents to observe messages sent and received by the contract parties; and
– an AgentSpeak(L) monitor agent that uses Section 4.4’s algorithm to process
the transition networks and messages relayed to the monitor by the observer.
Moreover, it includes mechanisms to deal with norms in the following way.
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Table 7 Repair time Obligation
NormType obligation
NormActivation Order for repair of engine E received
from Rolling Royce at time T
NormCondition either engine E repaired, or
it is less than 7 days after receipt of order
NormExpiration engine E repaired, or
it is 7 days or more after receipt of order
NormTarget Heathhedge
Table 8 Part Sourcing Prohibition (modelled as an obligation).
NormType obligation
NormActivation Order for repair of engine E received from Rolling Royce
NormCondition no order for a part P for engine E
is placed to manufacturer Cmans
NormExpiration
NormTarget Heathhedge
Table 9 Part Sourcing Permission.
NormType permission
NormActivation Order for repair of engine E received from Rolling Royce
NormCondition order for part P for engine E placed to manufacturer Loylands
NormExpiration
NormTarget Heathhedge
S1 S2
S4
S3
S5
 
N
hsr
hro
¬hsr ?¬N
¬hsr 
?¬N
N hsr
hsr
hsr
now > T + 7
now > T + 7
hro = 
happened(received(order_repair(E,T,hh,rr ))
hsr = 
happened(send(repair(E,T1,hh,rr ))
N = now ≤ T + 7
Key
TN1
Fig. 8 TN1 for Repair time Obligation in Table 7
– The contractual norms described above are mapped to transition networks la-
belled by messages sent and received by the above agents who are assumed to
have explicitly agreed that the above messages count as the various compo-
nents of the above norms. These transition networks (TN1, TN2, and TN3 ) are
shown in Figures 8 and 9, in which ‘rr’ and ‘hh’ respectively abbreviate ‘Rolling
Royce’ and ‘Heathhedge’, and ‘cm’ and ‘ll’ respectively abbreviate ‘Cmans’ and
‘Loylands’.
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Key hro = 
happened(received(order_repair(E,T,hh,rr ))
 hsop-cm = 
 happened(send(order_part(E,P,hh,cm ))
hsop-ll = 
happened(send(order_part(E,P,hh,ll ))
S1 S2
S4
S3
S5
 
hro
¬hsop-ll
¬hsop-ll
hsop-ll
hsop-ll
S1 S2
S4
S3
S5
 
hro
¬hsop-cm
¬hsop-cm
hsop-cm
hsop-cm
TN2 TN3
Fig. 9 TN2 for Part Sourcing Prohibition described in Table 8, and TN3 for Part Sourcing
Permission described in Table 9.
– Based on the above processing, the monitor sends norm status reports that are
displayed in a graphical user interface (see Figure 10) that is a proxy for the
manager.
Fig. 10 Screenshot of graphical user interface.
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The prototype is set up to execute a number of scenarios in which messages are
exchanged between Rolling Royce and Heathhedge, and between Heathhedge and part
manufacturers Cmans and Loylands. All messages exchanged are observed, and re-
layed to the monitor. On each time tick (every second), the monitor processes the
transition networks together with messages received from the observer, and relays
status reports for display in the graphical user interface (GUI) shown in Figure
10. For convenience, all executed scenarios interpret day long time periods as min-
utes, and begin with Heathhedge’s receipt of a message order repair(engine1, 13.00,
Heathhedge, Rolling Royce). Subsequent to the observer relaying happened(received
(order repair(engine1, 13.00, Heathhedge, Rolling Royce))) to the monitor’s message
store, the monitor creates instantiations of TN1, TN2, and TN3, each of which is
transitioned to S2 by the monitor, with the variable E in the arc labels instantiated
for E = engine1, and T instantiated by 13.00 in the arc labels of TN1.
Thus, activation of each norm is reported to the GUI (where this information
can in turn be relayed to the norm’s target Heathhedge). For each scenario, on the
next time tick after activation the following apply.
1. TN1 is transitioned to (and reported as being in) the non-violated state S4
given that the current time (now) is before 13.07.
2. TN2 is transitioned to (and reported as being in) the non-violated state S4
given that the observer reports that ¬happened(send(order part(
engine1, P, Heathhedge, Cmans))) holds true.9
3. TN3 is transitioned to (and reported as being in) the non-executed state S4
given that the observer reports that ¬happened(send(order part(
engine1, P, Heathhedge, Loylands))) holds true.
Table 10 NormMonitoringScenarios.
Scenario1 Repair obligation on Heathhedge expired and fulfilled.
Scenario2 Repair obligation on Heathhedge expired and violated.
Scenario3 Part sourcing prohibition violated by Heathhedge
Scenario4 Part sourcing permission executed by Heathhedge
Table 10 lists four implemented monitoring scenarios. In Scenario 1, the ob-
server reports that happened(send(repair(engine1, 13.04, Heathhedge, Rolling Royce)))
holds true, and so TN1 is transitioned from S4 to the expired state S5, with an
accompanying report to the GUI stating that the obligation has expired having
been fulfilled. Notice how this example illustrates an ‘unwise’ choice of observa-
tion for counting as fulfillment of the obligation, given that there is a possibility of
sanction avoidance: Heathhedge may not actually have repaired the engine within
seven days, but can avoid sanction by sending the message informing that the
repair has been done, so that the obligation is reported as having been fulfilled.
In Scenario 2, at 13.08, ¬(now ≤ 13.00 + 7) holds and no message informing of
repair is observed, so that TN1 is preferentially transitioned to S3 and then S5,
and the obligation is reported as having been violated and expired. In Scenario 3,
9 Note that we are assuming a negation as failure interpretation of ¬ in the sense that
¬happened(. . .) is evaluated to true iff happened(. . .) is not evaluated as being true.
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the observer reports that happened(send(order part(engine1, bearing, Heathhedge,
Cmans))) holds true, and so TN2 is transitioned from S4 to S3, with an ac-
companying report to the GUI stating that the prohibition has been violated. In
Scenario 4, the observer reports that happened(send(order part(engine1, bearing,
Heathhedge, Loyland))) holds true, and so TN3 is transitioned from S4 to S3, with
an accompanying report to the GUI informing that the permission has been exe-
cuted.
The above prototype illustrates a number of the features of this paper’s pro-
posed framework for monitoring, with particular emphasis on the framework’s
modular representations of norms as transition networks that do not commit to
specific representation of, or inter-dependencies between, norms in the normative
system being monitored (requirement R5 in Section 2.3), and requirements on
monitors to inform on the varying status of norms (requirements R3 and R4 in
Section 2.2). Note that with regard to the latter two requirements, the monitor’s
explanations of the status of norms (in particular explanations as to why a norm
is violated) is based on the labels of the specific arcs transitioned to the transition
networks’ corresponding state. In the following section we point to future work
addressing generation of more comprehensive explanations.
6 Future Work
Providing explanations of norm violations is particularly important if managers are
to assign responsibility and apply sanctions appropriately. Explanations can also
help to evolve the normative specification of a system in order to prevent future
violations. Thus far, our monitors provide limited explanation of violation and
fulfilment, in terms of the labels of the arcs transitioned. While such explanations
help to pinpoint the immediate cause of a norm’s violation, they do not help to
determine the overall circumstances relevant to violation, required for explaining
the indirect causes leading to violation. In future work we will therefore focus on
ways to recognise other observations of relevance to a violation, thus building a
richer picture of the surrounding circumstances.
One obvious starting point for building richer explanations would be to utilise
all the observations relayed to a monitor, and not only those observations that are
matched to the arcs of transition networks. For example, in Section 5’s monitoring
of an electronic contract, observers are entrusted to observe all messages received
and sent from Heathhedge; in particular, all messages sent to, and received from
part manufacturers. The availability of these messages could provide for more
comprehensive explanations. For example, Heathhedge’s violation of its prohibition
on ordering parts from Cmans may have been because of the non-availability of
the requested part from the permitted manufacturer Loylands, as indicated by
Heathhedge sending a request for the part to Loylands, and Heathhedge’s receipt of
Loylands’s reply denying the request given that the part is not in stock.
Given access to all observations, one can additionally enhance explanations by
accounting for the fact that a single observation may be responsible for transition
of multiple transition networks (as illustrated in Section 5). This means that vi-
olations or fulfilments of norms may have a common cause, and we can enhance
our explanations of one violation by reporting the observations causing transitions
in other transition networks with the same arc labels. For example, an engine re-
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quiring repair is an activation condition for both returning the engine to working
order, and for ordering parts necessary to make repairs, where each is monitored
separately. If the engine is not repaired in time (so violating the first obligation)
then observations relating to the ordering of parts may help explain why this was
the case (e.g., because of a delay in delivery of a part from a part manufacturer).
An explanation using this enhancement can thus take the form of a set of single
transition network explanations chained together by the observations common to
each transition network.
A monitor matches observations with the labels of transition networks repre-
senting norms, and so the observations received are those that are relevant only
to the norms being monitored. This is often inadequate for good explanations.
For example, a contract may place no obligations, prohibitions or permissions on
how engine parts are supplied, and so the monitor will receive no observations re-
garding this supply, but it may be exactly this factor that has led to the violation
of the obligation to repair an engine (i.e. something wrong with the part supply
chain). We aim to improve explanations generated by the same monitoring ma-
chinery described in this paper, by adding transition networks representing norms
not present in the contract but helpful purely for building better explanations:
explanation transition networks. So, in Section 5’s example, we would want to add
an explanation transition network (etr) for monitoring the part supply chain, to
ensure the monitor has records of observations relating to part supply and so can
determine where part supply problems and repair violations had a common cause.
An etr would have no qualitative difference from a transition network representing
a norm, and would be of type permission (rather than obligation or prohibition),
because it does not state what should happen, but what could happen; for exam-
ple, parts could be delivered by this supplier. There would, therefore, be no notion
of an etr itself being violated.
The focus of this paper has been on corrective monitoring, whereby critical
states are monitored for violation of norms. Predictive monitoring requires repre-
sentation and recognition of danger states, which are associated with agent be-
haviours that suggest that a norm may be in danger of violation. Future work will
address how such states may be identified empirically; for example by observing
and analysing violation of norms at runtime and the intermediate states that are
reached prior to violation. These intermediate states can then be represented ex-
plicitly (as extra nodes) in the transition network representation of norms, so that
during future run-time executions, observation of messages indicating transition
to these states may signal preemptive action to avoid violation. To illustrate, con-
sider that Loylands denied request for a part may suggest that Heathhedge is in
danger of violating its obligation to repair an engine in 7 days, or indeed, violating
its prohibition to order parts from Cmans. Thus, in the case of TN1, one could add
arcs from S2 and S4 to additional nodes D2−3 and D4−3 respectively, where each
arc is labelled by the message denying the part request. D2−3 and D4−3 would
represent danger states, and would both be then linked by arcs to S3, where these
latter arcs would have the same labels as (S2, S3) and (S4, S3), indicating violation
of the obligation.
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7 Related Work
Existing work in monitoring compliance with contractual obligations tends to fo-
cus on representations of the contracts tailored for the purpose, so playing the
same role as our transition networks. There is much less emphasis on the possible
architectures to support accurate monitoring or the requirements which inform
them, with approaches tending to favour a single, independent, trusted interme-
diary between the contract parties, able to gather all the information required for
monitoring, sometimes in conjunction with the parties themselves. However, [8],
do propose an architecture for overlaying multi-agent system normative knowledge
bases in which norms are represented as conditional rules. The architecture also
specifies monitoring and managing components that receive notifications of events
and actions, and processes these to determine the status of, and enforce, norms.
However, the monitoring functionality is described in abstract terms; the focus of
the work being on dynamic run-time assignment and re-assignment of roles, rights
and responsibilities to agents in normative multi-agent systems.
Requirements for contract monitoring systems are briefly considered by Neal et
al. [28]. Specifically, they consider non-functional requirements of a contract system
with monitoring: that a contract monitoring system should be platform-neutral;
integrate in a simple manner with existing systems; have accuracy of reporting
in a system with distributed clocks (so no single view of time); be able to scale
as more activity needs to be monitored; have security in exchange of information
to give confidence to monitoring outputs. They aim to meet these requirements
with a monitoring-tailored Business Contract Language (BCL), and supporting
components. BCL expresses obliged activity of system components (‘agents’ in
our terms), uses explicit time periods in which actions may/may not occur, and
employs a hierarchy (ontology) of monitored actions.
A number of works explicitily consider monintoring of norms in contracts. Work
such as [14,15] has investigated reasoning over business contracts in RuleML. This
work transforms a contract, expressed in RuleML, into defeasible logic, following
which reasoning can be performed to identify whether normative violation oc-
curred. While defeasible logic has been extended to cater for many different facets
of contractual reasoning (for example, by incorporating deadlines [13]), it is not
designed to deal with issues such as multiple repeated violations of a norm, and
representing this situation is thus cumbersome at best.
With regard to our use of Augmented Transition Networks (ATN s) for rep-
resenting states of norms in contracts, early work in AI and Law have also used
ATN s to model and represent contracts. [12] employed ATN s for representing a
kind of legal grammar of rules for “parsing” events having to do with offer and
acceptance. With each new event, such as a telephone enquiry or receipt of a letter,
the ATN determined the legal “state of affairs” as to whether there was a binding
contract. Furthermore, during the 1990s a series of workshops explored the use of
logical rules interpreting the United Nations Convention on the International Sale
of Goods, to deduce the legal state of affairs as other kinds of events in a contract
dispute occurrence. [38] is a good example of this work.
Others provide languages in which monitored contracts can be expressed. In
work by Daskalopulu et al. [6], a contract is represented as a finite state machine
(FSM), with actions in the environment (possibly initiated by agents), and the
resultant changes in the status of norms causing transitions between states. They
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then treat contract monitoring as the problem of determining which node of the
FSM represents the current state. Their formulation of the problem assumes fal-
lible observers of contract states, with each observer reporting back on what it
believes is the current contract state. Subjective logic operators are then used to
aggregate these observations, and identify the most likely contract state. Given the
focus on evidence aggregation, their work attacks the problem of contract moni-
toring at an abstract level, and no representation of the environment, contract, or
norms is suggested. Thus, states representing norm fulfilment, violation, and other
changes in the status of a norm must be encoded as part of the FSM. [27] also
specify a contract as sets of finite state machines, one for each party, so that the
parties taking part in a contract can monitor their own activity and know what
they can or must do next to ensure they meet their obligations and permissions.
As with our approach, state changes in the FSMs are triggered by state change,
where these changes correspond to communicative acts taking place. By placing
the FSM monitoring in centralised components, through which the contract par-
ties are required to communicate, violations of the contracted behaviour can be
detected and reported.
Some approaches consider norm monitoring at a more social level, as opposed
to at the level of individual interactions. For example, [20] present a norm-based
model of interaction between agents operating as part of an electronic institution.
They identify three different types of norms, namely institutional norms, consti-
tutional norms, and operational norms. Institutional norms govern the behaviour
of all agents within the institution, and represent the commitments of agents to-
wards the institution as a whole. Institutional norms thus represent the “social
contract” to which all agents operating within the institution are bound. Consti-
tutional norms are used to form virtual organisations, and regulate the virtual
organisation’s behaviour. They apply only to members of the organisation. Oper-
ational norms specify contracts between agents, and are narrower in scope than
those of constitutional norms. Monitoring takes place through rules represented
as an institutional norm. Institutional norms are presented, allowing agents to de-
termine whether an obligation is fulfilled or violated, and sanctioning norms (that
is, contrary to duty obligations) are similarly defined. The focus of the paper is
on the hierarchy of norms and the structure of the institutions, and monitoring is
thus presented as an example of the power of their framework, without going into
its applications or requirements in depth.
Xu and Jeusfeld [36] provides a formalisation of commitments which allows
their fulfilment to be monitored by the agent who has made those commitments
and, in particular, for obliged actions to be triggered. The commitments are mod-
elled as sequences of actions with deadlines, and dependencies between them en-
coded in temporal logic. By treating the dependencies as guard conditions, a mon-
itoring component can match actions against these conditions and notify the agent
of subsequent permissions and obligations. Taken to a more social level, Xu et al.
[37] extend their work to provide means to determine the blame in a system of
multiple agents bound by interconnected commitments. This allows them to detect
whether the cause of one agent having violated their obligation was that another
agent on which they depended had violated their obligation. Our own considera-
tion of mitigating circumstances for violations such as these, and how parties may
handle them, are discussed elsewhere [25].
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In [33], van der Torre and Tan describe DIO(DE)2, a formalism which provides
diagnostic and decision theoretic reasoning over norms. The former allows for the
identification of violation in historic contexts, while the latter predicts the effects
of actions on a system. DIO(DE)2 thus provides a form of monitoring, enabling
the identification of norm violations and norm compliance. However, unlike the
work presented here, their approach is theoretical in nature, with little consider-
ation given to practical issues, or for the modelling of complex real world norms.
Furthermore, no attention is given to issues such as communication between the
monitor and interested parties within the system.
The approach proposed by Fagundes et al. [10] considers norm enforcement
within stochastic environments and in which enforcement has a cost, and analyses
the tradeoffs between enforcement intensity and the cost of this enforcement. Such
an approach can be seen as an extension of the approach in this work that adds
stochasticity and costs to the environment. Nevertheless, the norm representation
used in the mechanism is much simpler than our work. Integrating such approaches
provides an interesting avenue for future research. Under a similar stochastic ap-
proach, Oh et al. [29] use a simple norm representation and plan recognition algo-
rithms to compute the probability of norm violations for humans planning for mul-
tiple objectives. The proposed Prognostic Normative Reasoning (PNR) approach
can then issue warnings and guide human users towards normatively-compliant
plans.
Recently, Alechina et. al. [3] examine how norms can be monitored when the
monitors have imperfect observational capabilities. Their focus was on optimally
modifying the norms themselves in such a way that the maximal number of viola-
tions can be detected. This work is in effect the dual of [4], which describes how
discrete monitors can be combined to monitor norms that cannot be observed by
individual monitors. Like our work, both of these strands of research concentrate
on corrective monitoring. However, they utilise a much simpler norm lifecycle than
we describe in the current work, and cannot easily be extended to perform pre-
dictive monitoring. More recently, Alechina et. al. [2] propose an LTL-based norm
formalism and examine the practical limits of enforcing such norms given limited
computational power and bounded lookahead capabilities. Unlike our work, the
enforcement mechanism described deals with regimented norms and uses a guard
mechanism that restricts possible actions in order to avert violations in future
states. However, a mechanism very similar to the one used to decide which ac-
tions to restrict can be used together with our monitoring mechanism to monitor
LTL-based norms and apply sanctions rather than directly prevent violations.
While there are many complementary ideas in the existing work on electronic
monitoring, which could extend our approach in fruitful directions, there are
unique characteristics to our approach which we argue are necessary in moni-
toring the electronic activity fulfilling norms of the complexity found in business
cases. In particular, most of the above approaches to monitoring do not distin-
guish between the data structures used for monitoring and the representations of
the norms themselves. A consequence of this is that the norms (for example, in
contracts) must be expressed in terms of observable events, often agent actions.
In comparison, we allow norms to state declarative achievement or maintenance
goals, which can be used by the agent to which the norm applies to plan its course
of action, and then map these structures to a separate representation for mon-
itoring: the transition networks. Another important distinction follows from this:
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we explicitly consider the common case where a norm concerns multiple instances
of an obligation (for example, for every order placed, goods should be delivered),
and can handle these instances happening in parallel in a scalable way, through
multiple independently monitored transition networks.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a framework for monitoring of electronic business
systems in which the behaviours of business parties are monitored to ensure that
prior commitments are adhered to, thus ensuring that business transactions can
take place in a secure and committed context. We have situated the study of how
to monitor fulfilment or violation of commitments in electronic business transac-
tions, by modelling such commitments as norms that are explicitly encoded in
multi-agent systems. This is because, as in electronic business transactions, the
agents to whom the norms apply are assumed to be self-interested, autonomous,
problem-solving entities working together to achieve some overarching objective,
while satisfying their own individual needs.
In the first part of the paper we enumerated a set of requirements that we
argue should be met by any general and reusable framework for monitoring of
normative multi-agent systems. The requirements are primarily designed so as to
ensure that:
1. some measure of assurance can be given that sanctions applied in case of viola-
tion will be applied only as and when appropriate, so encouraging participation
of agents in normative systems;
2. the framework is applicable to a wide variety of types of norms of varying
degrees of complexity; and
3. the framework is to some degree normative system neutral in making as few
commitments as possible to the specifics of the normative system being moni-
tored.
In the second part of the paper we described a framework for monitoring de-
signed to meet the aforementioned requirements. In order to meet the latter two
general requirements, the framework describes the deployment of monitors pro-
cessing transition network representations of achievement and maintenance norms
(that may apply to groups of agents) in the normative system being monitored,
where such representations assume only that the system’s norms conform to a
general and widely applicable semantic model of norms.
The transition network representations are labelled by states that the system’s
participating agents explicitly agree to as counting as the various states that any
given norm can be in, and the monitors’ processing of these network representa-
tions involves the matching of these labels with observations relayed by observers
who are entrusted by the participating agents to accurately observe and report
these observations. These features, together with the fact that limited explana-
tions of the various statuses of norms can be generated (so ensuring appropriate
assignment of responsibility in case of violation), provide for satisfaction of the
first requirement above.
In the third part of the paper we described an implementation of a monitor’s
processing of transition network representations of norms together with observa-
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tions, and validated the utility and feasibilty of our approach by prototyping the
monitoring of agents interacting in the context of an electronic business contract.
In conclusion we believe that the requirements we have set out for a general
and reusable framework for monitoring are comprehensive, and, as demonstrated
through our implementation, realisable.
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